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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAT*, u r u m u 
BRUCE HARTMAN, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, ' 
1 
v s ' 
LAWRENCE A. YOUNG 
ALMA S. YOUNG, 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
ZION'S FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendants - Respondents . 
) Case No. 14362 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - RESPONDENTS 
LAWRENCE A. YOUNG AND ALMA S. YOUNG * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Plaintiff from a Declaratory Judgment in the 
Dist r ic t Court for Uintah County by Judge George E. Ballif concerning a 
cont rac t , signed by Hartman and the Youngs, but which contract when payment 
thereon was proferred by Hartman, bore an unini t ia l led obvious al terat ion 
depriving the Youngs of one year ' s i n t e res t , which said al terat ion was denied 
by the Youngs a s being a part of the cont rac t . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judgment was given in favor of the Defendants Youngs. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents Youngs seek an affirmation of the action 
and judgment of the lower court in a l l r e s p e c t s . Attorney fees for the 
Defendants Youngs to be reserved . 
* In th i s brief, "Tr" refers to the page number of the Reporter's Transcript of 
the proceedings in the t r i a l . "R" refers to the page number of the material 
in the file from the Distr ic t Court . 
RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents controvert appe l l an t ' s Statement of Facts in that 
i t i s inconsis tent with the facts by way of important omissions a s shown 
in the Transcript, and Respondents make the following Statement of Facts 
a s they,find them, by way of addition to Appe l l an t s Statement of F a c t s . 
Respondents find Appellant 's Statement of Facts to be 
inconsis tent with the facts in that it does not d i s c lo se that there was a 
difference in the test imony concerning whether or not there was any a s s e n t 
on the part of the Respondents1 to the change in the date for accrual of 
in teres t to be p a i d to. t h e Youngs from "1972" to "1973". (Appellant's v " 
Brief, 1, L 14-16) " -
The Transcript supports Respondents ' statement and controverting 
Appellant 's statement: .. 
Mr. Young ind ica tes : 
"Q: Did you have any d i s cus s ion of changing "1972n to "1973" 
a t l ine 21 on page 2 ? " (Exhibit 3 ) . 
"A: No s i r . It was never ment ioned. It wasn ' t even thought 
of in any way, wha tsoever . " (Tr 126, L 26-29) . 
"Q: . . . d i d you personally have any d iscuss ion concerning a 
change of that "1972" to be marked over to read "1973" ?" 
"A: None, wha t soever . " 
"Q: Did you hear any other person d i s c u s s that c h a n g e ? " 
"A: It was never mentioned at a l l , to my knowledge. " 
(Tr 127, L 11-15). 
" 0 : Did you at any t ime , Mr. Young, give your a s s e n t to 
the change of the year that in teres t was to accrue from 1972 to 19 73 ?" 
"A: Absolutely n o t . " (Tr 129, L 11-14). 
M r s . Young indicated: 
"Q: Was there any d i scuss ion of changing "19 72" a s it 
appears on l ine 21 of page 2 ? Was there any d i scuss ion of changing 
the "1972" to "1973"?" 
"A: None wha t soeve r . " 
• • • 
"Q: Would you tel l us whether or not you ever gave your 
a s sen t to the change from "1972" to "1973" ?" 
"A: I did n o t . " 
" 0 : Did you ever have any d i scuss ion concerning giving up 
a year ' s i n t e r e s t ? ; " : ^ r 
"A: None wha t soever . " (Tr 139, L 3-6 & 23-28) . 
Respondents find Appellant 's Statement of Facts to be 
inconsis tent with the facts in that it descr ibes Exhibit 10 a s a "threatening 
let ter" from Defendants to Plaintiff. (Plaintiff-Appellant 's Brief, 2 L 21-22) 
The le t ter is open to examination by the Court a s Exhibit 10. It i s what is 
commonly known by at torneys a s a demand le t t e r . In this c a s e i t advised 
Hartman that he was in default on his payment, a view concurred in by 
the Trial Court . 
Respondents find Appellant's- Statement of Facts to be 
inconsistent with the facts in the following respec t s in the enumerated 
items found on. pages 3 and 4 ofethe Appellant 's Brief. " . 
No . 2 . Appe l l an t s Brief a l leges the Defendants ' Answer 
^ s t a t e s : "Defendant 's copy d o e s now show tha t April 10, 19 22: was changed 
to 1973" . This a s se r t ion in Appellant 's: , lSiatement o t E a c t s * i s FALSE. 
Defendant 's Answer s ta tes : ; "Defendant 's copy does .no t show that 
April 10, 1972 was c h a n g e d . . . " (Emphasis added) The Court may refer 
to the original copy of Defendants ' Answer in the Record on appeal to 
verify the fals i ty of Appellant 's Statement of F a c t s . (R 21 L3). Likewise 
^ the Court may refer to;Exhibit 3, of t h e record on appeal to verify the fact 
tha t Defendant 's copy indeed does not show "1972" changed to "1973". 
In his enumeration No . 6 on page 3 of his brief, Appellant 
has indicated emphasis by underscoring in the Youngs' Answer, which -re-
does not exis t ; hie has indicated an omission "default . . . in that" where no 
omission ex is t s in the text of the-Youngs Answer (R 21, L 11-13); and the- ;h« 
interest figure supplied by the Appellant is not the same a s in the Young's 
Answer. (R 21, L 13). 
There are suck sufficient addit ional inaccuracies in. the remaining 
enumerations of Appellant in which he at tempts to se t forth the Answer of 
the Youngs, that the Youngs, Defendants-Respondents herein merely request 
that the Court note the original Answer of the Youngs, now a part of the 
record in th i s c a s e for a correct statement of the content of the Answer 
of the Youngs. (Please s ee R 2.0-29 for the Youngs Answer.) 
Respondents find Appellant's Statement of Facts to be 
inconsistent with the facts in that at page 6, line 25, of Plaintiff's brief, 
a witness is quoted as speaking about the Agreement in question as saying, 
"I would have read it as 1973". On page 7, line 7, of Appellant's brief, 
the witness is quoted as saying, "So I assume that the change of the 
'72 to the '73 was there and read properly." 
Respondents would add to the Statement of Facts for a full 
understanding of the testimony of this witness that with reference to the 
change, at page 53 lines 19-22 of the Reporter's Transcript, the witness — 
said; ^ 
"Q; Now, you earlier said you did not know whether it was : 
there when you read this document?" 
"A: I can't swear to that; I assume that it was there and 
that I read i t . " (Emphasis added.) 
Other than the above corrections and additions, the Defendants 
Youngs concur generally with the Appellant's Statement of Facts. ~ 
% 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
1 . THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN FINDING THERE 
WAS NO MUTUAL ASSENT AS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A CHANGE 
IN THE ACCRUAL DATE FOR INTEREST FROM THE TYPEWRITTEN 
"1972" TO THE UNINITIALED ALTERATION BY PEN OF "1973". 
This is the only i s sue in th is c a u s e , and the subsequent 
points on appeal ci ted by the plaintiff are of no d i spos i t ive consequence , r 
The entire quest ion i s
 # "Should interest accrue from 1972, or from 1973?" n 
There i s no other ques t ion . On a l l three copies of the "Real Estate 
Contract and Escrow Agreement", it i s without argument tha t "1972" is 
the typewritten figure in the document designat ing the year on which 
interes t sha l l begin to acc rue . On Appellant-Hartman's copy (Exhibit 2) , : 
there i s an obvious al terat ion consis t ing of the marking over of the "2" k. 
to a " 3 " . There are no authent icat ing ini t ia ls by either Hartman himself 3 
or the Defendants Youngs, to val idate this extremely significant change. 
On the copy of the Agreement held in escrow a t the Bank (Exhibit 1), again 
there is an obvious al terat ion consis t ing of the marking over the "2" 
to a " 3 " . Again, there are no authent icat ing ini t ia ls by ei ther the Plaintiff 
or the Defendants Youngs to val idate th is highly important change . It 
must be borne in mind that the Plaintiff, of cou r se , had possess ion of 
his copy of the Agreement. Likewise, he had a c c e s s to the escrow copy 
(Exhibit 1) by way of having it removed from the escrow files and given to 
him on at leas t two occas ions when t h e Defendants Youngs were not p resen t , 
to wi t , November 18, 1973, (R 119, L 17-19) and January 2 3 , 1974,(R 39 , L 22-27) . 
Appellant Hartman in April of 1974, directed to the w i t n e s s , 
escrow officer Meagher, Requests for Admission (R 39 L 18-27) which s t a te : 
"14. Exhibit "A" (Exhibit 1), a t tached to the complaint is a 
true and genuine photo copy of the REAL ESTATE CONTRACT AND ESCROW W 
AGREEMENT executed by the par t ies at t he bank on April 10, 1972 a s it has 
s ince and always lain tothe vaul ts of defendant bank under the cus tody 
of N . J. Meagher, J r . " _ ^ 
"15. On or about January 2 3 , 1974, plaintiff and his attorney 
came to the bank and asked the undersigned to s e e the original of said 
agreement immediately above referred to ; and upon being shown the same, 
they requested that N . J. Meagher , Jr. make a cert if ication that said 
document to be photographed was a t r u e , genuine copy of the original 
agreement of the par t ies held in the bank esc row. " •-•-. .. ^ . 
Escrow officer Meagher on July 19, 1974, gave Hartman1 s 
counsel an Affidavit (R 119), indicating t h a t having failed to answer , the 
Requests foif Admission were thus deemed admit ted. The Affidavit further 
. m a k e s i t clear that he removed the Agreement (Exhibit 1) fepm the bank vault 
on N o v e m b e r s , 1 9 7 3 / a n d made i t - ava i l ab le to Hartman a t his r eques t ; 
and th i s was done outs ide the presence of the Respondents Youngs> theT^-
other part ies to the Agreement. •••/•-•: ' * £ • • ' • *4 - ^ 
Two important facts are obvious* , ,v 
' ^ 1. On January 2 3 , 1974 (Request for,Admission No. 15), 
(R 39 , L ia~21) Mr. Meagher could make a copy of the Agreement only a s . 
it exis ted on Jamiary 23;: 19 74, and under the fac ts of t b i s Qase, such a 
copy cannot be a s se r t ed to be a cepy of the original agreement a s it appeared 
on April 10, 1972. All th is notwithstanding Meagher ' s failure to respond to 
the Reques t s , and his subsequent furnishing of an Affidavit tp Hartmari's 
counse l that the Requests are deemed "admit ted" . 
2 . "Admission No. 14" cannot be believed for it a s s e r t s that 
a s of April 10, 1972, the Agreement, "has s ince and always lain in the 
vault of the defendant bank" . Yet, Meagher1 s Affidavit s t a tes that on 
November 18, 19.73 f-tie took the Agreement out of the vault for Appellant 
Hartman and his two b o y s , and h is Admission No. 15 s t a t e s that on or 
about January 2 3 , 1974, he took the Agreement out aga in , and showed it 
to Hartman, a i r of th is being outside t he presence of the other par t ies to 
the Agreement^ the Respondents Youngs. Again, a l l this notwithstanding 
Meagher ' s Affidavit t o Hartman1 s counsel that the Requests are deemed 
"admit ted". . = . - C 
The Defendants Youngs copy of the Agreement (Exhibit 3) has 
neither the a l terat ion i tself , nor, of course , any ini t ia ls authorizing the 
obvious a l te ra t ion . . .-,:,r*. -
-^ - Appellant# in s tat ing a s his first Argument on a p p e a l , "The ? 
Court erred in failing to find the interest accrual date resul ted froms? 
agreements ^ - i s simply s tat ing that= he i s d i ssa t i s f ied and disgruntled ^s-^ 
with the dec is ion of the Trial Court, and alleging that what he d i sagrees 
with is error on the part of the Court. 
The Trial Court had the benefit of the p lead ings , and extens ive 
discovery information submitted by the Respondents Youngs pursuant to 
requests of the Appellant Hartman. The t r ia l court in denying Motions 
for Summary Judgment on the part of both pa r t i e s , s ta ted in i ts Ruling 
of January 31, 1975, t h a t , "The i s sue of fact a s t o an a s s e n t of a l l the 
parties to the alteration of the date April 10, 1972 (3) remains. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof on same." (R 201) 
The lawsuit went to trial to the court without a jury on this 
issue of fact, clearly the only matter in dispute. Upon hearing the 
testimony of all those who could shed any light whatsoever on this issue, 
the Court in its Decision and in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, (R 380,L 16-20 and R 391, L 19-22) , stated: "On this evidence alone, 
and the fact that the third original did not bear the alteration it would 
appear that the alteration of the date in question was the result of an ^r 
inadvertance or mistake rather than pursuant to agreement between the r: 
part ies." (Emphasis added.) The "third original" was Exhibit 3 , the 
copy of the Respondents Youngs. 
Thus Appellant Hartman1 s first point for seeking reversal 
of the judgment of the District Court is simply that he disagrees with 
the Court's evaluation of the evidence, and presumes that he, as Plaintiff 
must be correct. :*L 
The testimony before the Court to consider in determining if 
on the part of the Youngs there was assent to , or even knowledge of, the 
uninitialed alteration was as set forth below according to the Transcript 
of the trial . 
First, however, let us examine the record to properly 
understand the role of the witness Mr. Meagher. He represented Hartman 
during the negotiations at the Bank, although as an escrow officer he had 
a fiduciary duty to both Hartman and the Youngs. Please see R 61, L 13-17 
(page two of Defendants Youngs Answers to Requests for Admissions) wherein 
the Youngs s t a te : "Defendants admit that the said bank officer, N . J . 
Meagher, Jr. was present and participated- in d i sucss ions between the 
plaintiff and the defendants pertaining t o t h e agreement , and further 
a l lege that the plaintiff (Hartman) wanted Mr, N. T. Meagher , J r . , to 
represent his i n t e r e s t s , to which the defendants consen ted . (Emphasis added) 
The incontestabi l i ty of the truthfulness of th is statement of 
the Youngs is authent ica ted by Interrogatory No. U> of the Plaintiff, £• 
Hartman (R 79 , L 10J14) wherein h& Sta tes : f"4^.;;i"" -S 
" T l . Plaintiff i s now informed that the banker N ^ J , Meagher, Jr. 
t akes the posit ion that he ins is ted upon and wrote in his own hand the said 
expression: "or $22 ,921.00" . Do the defendants take exception therewith 
or will they d i spu te the said claim of said banker? Explain ful ly ." 
(Emphasis added . ) >v 
This provision enlarges t h e provisions of the "forgiveness of 
requirement to pay" c l a u s e , thereby foregoing timely receipt of money due 
to the^oung s if Hartman should be unable to pay whert d u e . Examining . . . 
the Transcript, page 24, l ines 6 to IF, Mr. Meagher s t a t e s : ^ 
"Well , Mr. Hartman was going to borrow from the Bank the 
down payment to be made to complete the t r ansac t ion , which was a 
separate dea l 'be tween Mr. Hartman and Zions First National Bank. And 
with that^down payment he was going td apply it to the Real Estate Contract 
and the purchase of the c o w s . " 
At l ines 17 - 20 of the same page , we find the down payment 
which Was to be borrowed from the Bank w a s t o be $33, 000 . 0 0 . It is clear 
that Mr. Meagher1 s ins i s tence upon terms favorable to Hartman and
 : 
detrimental to t he Youngs was indeed genuine and in tent ional . 
1 :
 L ikewise , the record^Hows that-Mr. Meagher was served with -
Requests for Admissions (R 37 - 41) by Hartman1 s c o u n s e l , which requests -
contained admiss ions total ly contrary to the in te res t s of the Youngs, 
specif ical ly , numbers 14, 15 and 22 . (R 39 L 18-2 7 and R 40 L 17-21) 
The record further shows that t he se reques t s were not answered , and what 
is more, Mr. Meagher supplied Hartman's counsel with an "Affidavit" that 
through failure to answer , the reques ts are deemed admit ted. (R 75). 
Now l e t lis examine the test imony of Mr. Meagher asdfcs i t 
appl ies to the i s s u e of the c a s e a s se t forth by the Ruling of the Distr ict 
Court, whether or not there was an a s s e n t of a l l the par t ies to the 
alteration of the d a t e , April 10, "1972" to "1973". 
Mr. Meagher s t a t e s a s to the time of the d i scuss ion concerning 
the Agreement: 
" . . . their minds were not completely in accord at that 
particular t i m e . " (Tr 24 , L 29,30) 
And he left repeatedly while Hartman and the Youngs negot ia ted, 
clearly disqualifying himself to make any prec ise observat ions a s to the 
provisions under d i s c u s s i o n , or more particularly any a s s e n t to a l te ra t ions 
of terms. (Tr 2 5 , L 2 , and 8-10) 
This is further substant ia ted by the following from the ~~~ 
transcript concerning Page 2 and Page 5 of the Agreement: (The Agreement 
being in three c o p i e s , Exhibits 1, 2 , and 3.) 
" . . . the problem was that if they paid the th i r ty- three 
thousand. . . the ques t ions w a s , would they have the money to pay a t th is 
date from the operat ion of the dairy herd. 
And that was what the Hartmans and the Youngs were trying 
to iron out and agree upon . " (Tr 28 , L 1-7) 
"Well the quest ion was whether or not they could, after paying 
the thi r ty- three thousand , whether or not they could pay the $22,921.00 
with only five or s ix or seven months of operation of the dairy herd out of 
the proceeds of what they were trying to d o . (Tr 28 L 24-28) 
"And do you remember anything that was said by them or by 
you at that place and t i m e ? " (Tr 28 , L 29-30) 
"No, I'.don't remember the de ta i l s ; I remember that that was 
the essence of the d i scuss ion and probably the e s s e n c e of the c h a n g e s . " 
(Tr 29 L 1-3) (Emphasis added . ) 
"This would be i t looks like page 5. (Tr 29 L 17-18) 
-. . .Now that portion 'or $22,921.00 ' is in my handwriting on page 5 , * 
and was added, which was the e s sence of the d i scuss ions that were 
being had by the Youngs and the Hartmans.as to how they could make 
their payments ;^ (Tr 29 L 23-27) (Emphasis added) t v 
The t r ia l court thus had the foregoing test imony to illuminate 
for it what went on as to the only i s sue in th is c a s e , the quest ion of 
a s sen t to the a l terat ion of the interest accrual date of the Agreement 
from "19?2 f *to"1973" . 
The only d i scuss ion which Plaintiff 's wi tness can tes t i fy t o , 
deals with genera l negot ia t ion, not directed to the al terat ion of the year 
nor the payment of in te res t , and specif ical ly not toward a reduction in 
in teres t , but directed to the month when the payment would become due . 
Thus the test imony shows only a d i scuss ion leading to the change from 
November to January, on l ine 25 of page 2 of the Agreement. (Exhibits 1, 
2 , and 3) Nowhere does the conversat ion tes t i f ied to deal with a 
relinquishment of one year ' s interest by the Youngs, or es tab l i sh anything 
remotely resembling a s s e n t to such a proposit ion. 
The remaining d i scuss ion which Plaintiff 's wi tness can testify 
to , deals with material found on page 5 of the Agreement, where he himself -
participated by way of ins is t ing on greater deta i l in the provision whereby 
the Youngs would give more t ime to Hartman if needed to meet his obligation 
to pay. Appellant Hartman at page 37 of his brief r idicules this provision 
made in his behalf a t the ins i s t ence of his wi tness Meagher,("Shades of 
lack of mutual i ty . . . " ) , but he does point up the purpose of the dispute 
and continuing negotiations leading to an authenticated alteration 
between Hartman and the Youngs: "it was imperative that the payments 
fall due not in cold January, but in November when the cattle are sold." 
This we can see , as the Trial Court saw, was the subject of 
discussion, and the only subject of discussion between the parties put 
into evidence by Mr. Meagher. It is simply asking the Trial Court and the 
Supreme Court to believe the incredible to ask them to believe that the 
Youngs, who fought strenuously and at length over this point before 
conceding such generous forgiveness of payment terms to Hartman, - that 
the Youngs would forego a full year's interest without a noticeable protest 
which could be remembered and testified about later when it came into 
question. 
At this point, without more, the correctness of the Trial Court's 
findings and decision is made clear. Was there any discussion concerning 
the purported change of the interest accrual date from "1972" to "1973" ? The 
answer is NO. Was there assent to this very significant alteration? 
Again the answer, dispositive of this case , is NO. The Plaintifffs witness 
Meagher has made it clear that insofar as he is aware, the Youngs were strong 
opposed to changes to their detriment, resisted such proposals vigorously 
when they were made, and only after such struggles as made their position 
of reluctance clearly remembered, did they agree to the change allowing 
the payment to be paid in November, late in the year, instead of in January, 
and the further change, upon the insistence of the escrow holder, the 
representat ive of Hartman, to a generous "forgiveness of payment" 
c l a u s e , if Hartman could not meet the full amount of h i s obl igat ion. 
The Youngs consented to an extension of time for Hartman 
to pay, but never to a diminishment in the amount. -------------
' • ' •.* * The- Plaintiff 's w i t n e s s , Mr. Meagher, makes it posi t ively 
clear to the Distr ic t Court si t t ing.without a jury, that he not only knows 
of no such conversat ion about a rel inquishment of a year ' s interest 
by the Youngs, (a sum of about $4,100.00) , but consequent ly he most 
assuredly has no test imony to offer even suggesting a s s e n t by the 
Young's to such a proposals s 
•&"" Two more matters which convincingly uphold the correc tness 
- o f the Trial Court ' s decis ion must not go unnot iced. - , r 
*
vii :
 Miv*MeH§her s t a t e s the proceedings of the t ransact ion 
progressed to the s tage where the various copies were being, conformed. -
(Tr 29 L 12-13) But a simple examination shows t h a copies (Exhibits 1, 2 , 
and 3) do not conform to one another^ ' , ^ > . 
V Mr. Meagher s t a t e s that he sa id , "All r ight . Everybody 
initial this Agreement." (Tr 31, L 8-9) . Following t h i s , Mr. Meagher, 
[who had the original (Ti*-26, L 6-7) ] s ta ted ". . . i t was given to Mr . Hartman, 
then to Mr. Young, and then to M r s . Young to init ial on page 2 and page 5. 
(Tr 31, L 12-14) Further, "And then we proceeded, as I r e c a l l , to ini t ia l 
the Young Contract and the Hartman c o p i e s , assuming that they had 
previously been conformed." (Tr 31, L 18-20)- — ^ 
To refuse to accept the Trial Cour t ' s dec is ion is simply to 
fault it for refusing to bel ieve the unbe l i evab le . 
The Bank copy (Exhibit 1) of the Agreement bears the ini t ia ls 
of the part ies at the al terat ion of "January" to "November" on l ine 24 
of page 2 . The Bank copy of the Agreement bears the ini t ia ls of the *"-\ 
par t ies at the interl ineation in the "forgiveness of payment" c lause 
on page 5 . 
The Hartman copy (Exhibit 2) of the Agreement bears the 
in i t ia ls of the part ies at the al terat ion of "January" to "November" 
on line 24 of page 2 . The Hartman copy of the Agreement bears the 
in i t ia ls of the par t ies at the interl ineation in the "forgiveness of payment" 
c lause on page 5 . 
The Young's copy (Exhibit 3) of t he Agreement bears the 
in i t ia ls of the part ies at the al terat ion of "January" to "November" on line 
24 of page 2 . The Youngs copy of the Agreement bears the ini t ia ls of the 
par t ies at t h 6 Interlineation3 in the "forgiveness of payment" c l ause on •-**". 
page 5 . 
With a l l of this "conforming" and "ini t ia l l ing" and pass ing 
of a l l copies back and forth until each and every party had had in his 
hands and in his view each and every copy, how did it come to be that 
the copies in fact were not conformed a s to the a l t e ra t ion , and were not 
ini t ial led on this significant point ? 
This change , from "1972" to "1973" was not init ialled by any 
party on any copy, and yet the copies were p a s s e d to a l l for the specific 
purpose of affixing i n i t i a l s . 
Considering this s tate of the ev idence , plus the failure of 
Mr. Meagher to be able to provide a srcintilla of evidence of art indication 
of a s sen t to the unini t ia l led unsupported a l te ra t ion , it is quite clear that the 
finding of the Trial Court that there was no a s s e n t to the al terat ion is 
correct beyond dispute or cr i t ic ism. ^ * - *•••'*-
Other pertinent testimony by Mr. Meagher was:^.,.\-:'^yr. 
"The only change that we caught in the final reading was 
the change of the 2rid of November. So I a s s u m e d that the change of 
the ' 72 to the '73 was there and read-properly." (Emphasis added) 
(Tr 44, L 13-15) > - , 
"Q: " . . .do you recal l any d i scuss ion concerning a change 
from 19 72 to 1 9 7 3 ? . " 
& "A: No. That is why I think the '73 was t h e r e . . . " 
(Emphasis added . ) (Tr 45 , L 5-7) :,:^--^,- ^ . 
«•• ;/;v,. , The foregoing certainly shows Mr. Meagher can give no 
test imony on the i s s u e , and additionally points out a very unreliable—^j.-e 
form of reason ing . His unrel iabil i ty is even further es tabl i shed by the 
following: ^ : : ^a 
"Q: Mr. Meagher, did you, at any t ime , receive some 
reques t s for admiss ions from Mr. Lamoreaux in th is c a u s e ? " 
"A: Yes , s i r , I believe I d id . (Jr 49 , L 5-8) 
"Q: Do you recall whether or not you responded to those 
reques ts for a d m i s s i o n s ? " ; ^ r 
"A: Yes , s i r , I believe I d i d . " (Tr 49 , L 11-13) 
M Q : " . . . D o you recal l ever having responded to t h e s e ? " 
"A: I think I probably d id , if I was requested to respond to 
them. Yes , s i r . " (Tr 49 , L 23-25) 
"Mr. Lamoreaux: (Hartman's counsel) He did not r e spond . " 
(Tr 50, L 2) 
This shows how unreliably Mr. Meagher reca l l s what he 
personal ly did or failed to d o . He was served by Plaintiff 's counsel with 
Requests for Admission in 19 74. (R 3 7-41) They contained "Admissions" 
qui te detrimental to the in teres ts of the Youngs. Mr. Meagher then 
supplied Plaintiff 's counsel an Affidavit (R 75) that by reason of his ^ 
failure to respond, the "Requests for Admissions" are now deemed admitted* 
(It should be remembered that a s escrow officer, Mr. Meagher has a 
responsib i l i ty to be neutral as between Hartman and the Youngs, and 
has an equal fiduciary duty to both of them.) 
In spi te of not responding and supplying an Affidavit so 
s t a t ing , Mr. Meagher s t a tes in Court that he be l i eves , he t h inks , he d id . 
With a memory so poor in 19 75 of what he personal ly did in 19 74, t h e weighty , , 
his credibil i ty in 1975 is enti t led t o , a s to what was on a document in 19 72 
is very c l ea r . His credibil i ty is very low. 
The absolute fact that Mr . Meagher can shed no light 
whatsoever on the i s sue is es tab l i shed by the following: 
"Q: Now Mr. Meagher, going back to the change on page 2 
at l ine 21, (Exhibits 1 , 2 , and 3) the change of the '72 to the ' 7 3 , do you 
know when the change was made? 
"A: No, s i r . " 
"Q: Do you know who made that change? " (Tr 52,L 26-30) 
"The Court: Did you hear it d i scussed amongst the part ies 
at that t ime?" ^ . -
<: -> "The W i t n e s s : As to that specific change , no , a s ide from 
-having read it t o everybody there ." (Emphasis added. ) 
"Q: (by Mr. Park) Now, you earlier said you did not know 
whether it was there when you read this document?" 
"A: I can ' t swear to that ; I assume that it was there and 
that I read i t . " (Emphasis added . ) (Tr 53 , L 15-22) 
•«sr,- * Now l e t u s examii^e briefly the test imony of the other persons 
present during the negotiat ions on the document under considera t ion , a s 
to the i s sue of a s sen t to a change of the year from "1972" to "1973". 
Hartman's counsel cal led Hartman's at tention to Page 2 of 
-r Exhibit 3 , which was the Young's copy of the Agreement. (Tr 69, L 28-29) 
Hartman claims to have changed the "January" to "November" on the 
Young's copy, but c lear ly , he did n o t ^ h a n g e the^Q972" to "1973" o n . 
^ - the i r copy^for:nq :fsuch^change ex is t s on their copyv This clearly s h o w s ^ w ^ 
that the one change agreed to was made , a s shown by the initiall ing by 
the par t ies . A purported change that was not agreed t o nor . .discussed, a ^ 
change of "1972" to "1973" , was not.made nor in i t ia l led . 
In January of 19 73 Hartman received a not ice of Assignment 
(Exhibit 5 ) , which stated that the .Agreement ass igned was to be<ar in teres t ^ v ^ 
from the 10th of April 1972. (Tr 89 L 7-9 & 13) 
Having received t h i s , he made no protest or communication 
to either the Youngs or the Bank concerning the fact that the year for r 
interest accrual to begin was set forth a s "1972". (Tr 91, L 15-19) 
Concerning any d i scuss ion a l legedly supporting a claim of 
a s sen t by the Youngs to the a l te ra t ion , Hartman s ta ted: 
Referring to Meagher: 
"You don ' t reca l l him saying anything about th i s c h a n g e ? " 
" N o . " (Tr 94 , L 9-11) 
Referring to Randy Hartman: 
"Did Randy Hartman say anything about the c h a n g e ? " 
"Not that I r e c a l l . " (Tr 94 , L 13-14) 
Further: 
"Randy and Brent both commented and we d i scussed the fact 
that we couldn ' t pack i t . Yes , they both commented t h e r e . " (TR 9 4 , L 18-20) 
It i s c lear that such d i scuss ion a s Hartman claims took place 
involved only his own family, and not the other par t ies to the Agreement, 
whose a s s e n t was e s sen t i a l to val idate any proposed change . 
"Do you recal l anything speci f ica l ly , any exact s tatement 
that Mr. Young m a d e ? " -
"No , I don' t recal l t h a t . " 
"Do you reca l l any_exact s tatement that ,Mrs* Younganade^.^- -s*" 
concerning the c h a n g e ? " 
"No, not concerning the c h a n g e . " (TR 95 L 24-28) 
While much of what has been se t forth above by Mr. Hartman is 
contradicted by himself in other s tatements of h i s , it is es tab l i shed beyond 
quest ion that the t r ia l court , in looking to see if a s s e n t e x i s t s , ge ts 
nothing supportive of that proposition from Hartman. 
The tes t imony of Randy B. Hartman, the son and bus iness 
partner of the Plaintiff, Mr. Hartman, to the extent that it addressed the 
i s s u e d i sc losed the following: 
After referring to Exhibit 1, the escrow copy of the Agreement, 
the following took place: *fe 
"Turn to page 2 . Can you remember any d iscuss ion concerning 
a da te when interest would begin to a c c r u e . . . ? "Was it d i s c u s s e d ? " 
"I can ' t remember if i t was d i scussed or not . To my best 
knowledge it was d i s c u s s e d . But I can ' t real ly s ay for sure whether it 
was or n o t . " (Tr 103, L 17-23) (Emphasis added . ) 
"I want you to talk about the 1972 that i s changed to 1973. 
Do you know anytfting about that change? 1 -
"Wel l , I know there was something said about the six percent 
in t e res t , and there was a l i t t le argument between Dad and Alma and that 
time on i t . " . . . 
"What did you hear said concerning when the interest was to 
s t a r t ? " . . . 
^ ' • ' • " " - < • > ' • ' ' • . 
"I can ' t really say; I can ' t remember that far back . " 
(TV 104, L 6-10, 15, 16, & 18.) (Emphasis added . ) 
It is c lear that there is nothing here that would substant ia te 
t h e Plaintiff 's claim and warrant the trial court in finding a s sen t to such 
a change . t 
" i Brent Fisher, the P la in t i f f ' s . son- in- law testif ied next; ^ ^ 
' After referring to page 2 of Exhibit 1, Fisher was asked: 
" . . .Were any changes ta lked about that day between the..... 
part ies at the bank?" 
"Well , we d i scussed about the payment, when i t would be 
bes t to make our payment." (Emphasis added. ) 
"What was sa id , and by whom?" ',yr:^€yr * 
"Well , Bruce and Lawrence both decided it would be better to 
make the payment in the f a l l . " (Tr 112, L 11-17 & 21,22.) 
The Trial Court could not help but not ice that this was not 
a s s e n t to a change of the date for accrual of i n t e re s t , but ins tead , was 
a d i scuss ion as to the time of payment. 
Hartman1 s counsel leads Fisher into a d i scuss ion of a 
purported change inthe interest date thusly: 
"Now, was there a d i scuss ion about when the in teres t 
would begin to a c c r u e ? " . . . 
"I know there was kind of a l i t t le argument and d i scuss ion 
on i t . " (Tr 113 L 15, 16, 24 , 
"And did Bruce ask that it be deferred and not begin to a c c r u e ? " 
"Yes , until March, the date that we signed th i s Cont rac t , " 
(Emphasis added . ) (Tr 114, L 11-14) 
The notarizat ion of Exhibit 1 and a l l other tes t imony pertinent 
to the date thereof indica tes that it i s dated April 10, 19 72. 
Three things are obvious a s to the test imony of F isher . F i rs t , 
he is in error a s to the date of the signing of the Agreement, which puts 
his abi l i ty to reca l l into ques t ion . Second, he was unable to es tab l i sh 
an a s s e n t on the part of the Youngs to the change of "1972" to "1973". 
MOST IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, HE STATES THAT INTEREST 
IS TO BEGIN TO ACCRUE " THE DATE WE SIGNED THIS CONTRACT. " 
THAT DATE IS APRIL 10, 1972. 
As to his own role or d i scuss ion concerning the change , he 
sa id , "I probably don ' t remember what I sa id , . . . " and "Wel l , I can ' t 
say that I said any th ing . " (Tr 117, L 18, 19, & 27) 
A brief review of the test imony of the Youngs, who 
Hartman c l a i m s , gave their a s sen t to the change , c lear ly shows that 
they did not give their a s s e n t . Mr. Young ind ica tes : 
"Q: Did you have any d i scuss ion of changing "1972" to "1973" 
a t l ine 21 on page 2 ? " 
"A: No , s i r . It was never mentioned. It wasn ' t even thought 
of in any way , whatsoever . (Tr 126, L 26-29) 
" Q : . . .did you personal ly have any d i scuss ion concerning a 
change of "1972" to be marked over to read "1973" ?" 
"A: None, wha t soeve r . " 
"Q: Did you hear any other person d i scuss that c h a n g e ? " 
"A: It was never mentioned at a l l , to my knowledge ." 
(Tr 127, L 11-15) - ^ - - -
M r s . Young upon quest ioning indicated the following: 
~ "Q: Was there any d i scuss ion of changing "1972" a s it 
appears on l ine 21 of page 2. Was there any d iscuss ion of changing 
the "1972" to "1973" ?" 
" "A: None wha t soeve r . " (Tr 139 , L 3-6) : 
*• Mr. David Sam, who w a ^ p r e s e n t for a large part of the time 
during which the Agreement was being d i s c u s s e d s ta ted: :1^ 
- "Q: Do you recal l any conversat ion concerning the changing 
on page 2 at l ine 21, the year that interest was to accrue from '1972* 
to '1973 '?" 
•fX-"A: I r eca l l no-conversation regarding th i s . . . V1 (Tr 148, L 14-17) 
POINT TWO 
II . THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN PLACING 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE PLAINTIFF, AS THERE 
IS NO AUTHORITY REQUIRING THAT IN A DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT ACTION THE PLAIN TEFF"S BURDEN OF 
PROOF MUST SHIFT TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff a l l eges that the i s s u e at the tr ial and before this 
Court is one of l aw , not of fac t . (Plaintiff's Brief, p . 17) This would 
overlook the only i s s u e before the court , whether or not the obvious 
uninitialed a l tera t ion was a part of the contract by mutual a s s e n t . This 
i s the quest ion of fact the t r ia l court had to dec ide in order to reach a 
decis ion in the c a s e . 
Plaintiff c i t e s a fragment of the language of Oil Shale Corp .* 
vs Larson, 438 P2d 540, 20 Utah 2d 369 , a s follows: 
"Ordinari ly, under the (Declaratory Judgment) s t a tu t e , 
the instrument under which someone wishes to have the court resolve " 
doubts ar is ing from the language u s e d , i s simply a matter of law to be 
decided by the court from the wording thereof. However, under 78-33-9 of 
the Act, if there be an i s s u e of fact involved, it is t r iable as in other c a s e s . 
That is the c a s e h e r e . (Emphasis added) 
The underscored part of the above quotation is supplied by the 
Defendants to extend the quoted language of the court to make it appl icable 
to the ca se at hand . 
Obvious ly , the language cited by the Plaintiff is not appl icable 
to this c a s e . For in th is c a s e , we do not have a mere quest ion of what 
does the language in the document mean . We have a quest ion of fac t , to 
wit , what is the language used in t h e cont rac t . Is i t n1972", as 
typewritten into the document, or is it , l1973 , , / a s someone has marked 
over on two cop ie s , but which al terat ion has no authent icat ing in i t i a l s , 
on any copy of the Agreement, 
.^ The s ta tute ci ted by the Court in Oil Shale vs Larson, ; \ 
(supra) r e a d s : . . . . ^
 v 
" 7 8 - 3 3 - 9 . Trial of i s s u e s of f ac t . — When a proceeding 
under this chapter {Chapter 3 3 , Declaratory Judgments) involves the 
determination of an i s s u e of fact , such i s s u e may be tried and determined 
.. in the same manner a s i s s u e s of fact are tried and determined in other 
c iv i l ac t ions in the court in which the proceeding is pending ." ,.„... . 
It i s c lear that in the ca se . a t hand the t r ia l court ruled and 
proceeded correctly^wJt had a quest ion of fact to determine, and it did. s o . .„.._.'.. .,:, 
Plaintiff was asser t ing the validity of an obvious unini t ia ted al terat ion to a 
contraet , the authent ic i ty of which was vigQrously denied by the other 
par t ies to the cont rac t . Plaintiff had the burden of complying with t he :,. :^, 
ruling of the court to #iow a s s e r t to this change . The greater portion of al l the 
testimony presented a t the t r ia l went to th is i ssue*^Plaint i f f failed to meet ~ 
his burden, - v ^ . ', :^r\ ,.'••,-- •''-'"•--• 
Numerous Utah Supreme Court c a s e s uphold the tr ial court in 
performing i ts function a s trier of the facts : , . ,<w 
•••*;. Child vs Child, 332 P2d 981, 8 Utah 2d 261 indica tes : .,.. . 
"In view of the advantages of the t r i a l cour t asvtrier^of the , . 
f a c t s , in judging credibil i ty of wi tnesses and determining the f ac t s , the 
pass ing on such matters is exclusively within the province of the tr ial cour t . " 
...:„ , Green vs Equitable Life Assur. Soc . 284,P2d 695 , 3 Utah 2d 375 
ind ica tes : . . _ ......... _ , 
Where the trial judge saw and heard the w i t n e s s e s , he was in a 
better posit ion than the Supreme Court to properly evaluate it and to p a s s 
upon their credibi l i ty . 
American Scale Mfg. Co. vs Zee, 235 P2d 361, 120 Utah 402, 
indicates: 
"The Trial Court is in a better position to observe the manner 
and demeanor and adjudge the credibility of a witness than the appellate 
court, and the trial judge can disbelieve a witness in part or entirety." 
Appellant's position in this point on appeal is simply that he 
did not want to meet the Plaintiff's burden, although he was the Plaintiff, 
and further, that when the court ruled that he indeed did not meet his 
burden, the trial court was in error in its evaluation of the testimony. 
Plaintiff alleges that, "All issues of fact vanished quickly — 
by reason of the affirmative defense pleaded by de fendan t . . . . " 
'(Plaintiff's brief, 17 L 13-14) Defendants are confident that the Utah " 
Supreme Court does not subscribe to this concept. 
The Defendants acknowledged that there was a signed Agreement, 
but denied the validity of the uninitialled alteration. Plaintiff Hartman, 
who wished to pay according to the altered terms, thereby paying several 
thousand dollars less to the Defendants Youngs, was told by the trial court 
that if he wished to take advantage of the alteration, he would have the 
burden of establishing assent to i t , and its validity and genuine existence 
as a term of the Agreement if his claim were true. This the Plaintiff could 
not do despite his best efforts, simply because the alteration was not a 
part of the Agreement* 
Plaintiff alleges (Plaintiff's brief, 17, L 19-20) that this case 
is a matter of a "fully executed, verified contract, laying in escrow at 
a respectful (?) bank. . . " This of course, begs the question before the --
court. What contract, if any, exists? A contract reading "1972", or a 
contract reading "1973" ? v 
Plaintiff alleges, (Plaintiff's brief, 17, L 16-17) that ^ „: 
"The honorable trial court has, from the beginning, misconceived the ; 
law of this case." What is apparent is that the Plaintiff, not the;Court, \:,.t x 
has misunderstood the very nature of the case, and the very question at ^ . 
issue, from the outset. ^ -.-- -,•?• ^ ^- '^••..^.•^- . 
It is clear that this "point" Plaintiff relies up for reversal ; v, 
of the trial court is simply his~ own incorrect view. By Plaintiff's, v 
misconception of the case, and his persistence in following his misconception, 
nothing further he presents is directed to the issue. 
:M % - In the instant ca^se, we do not have a valid document to be ; 
interpreted, but rather a question of a document bearing an obvious '*•;••;•;';... 
alteration* We do not have a case, where the only decision to be reached * 
by the trial court is a matter of; law.; We have a:^question of fact* indeed 
the only issue. Plaintiff persistently wants to beg the question, assume 
the validity of the-document altered to his benefit, and cite cases which 
do not have the same basic question as the case at hand.UHence, his -^ 
other references are inapplicable as purporting to deal with what the 
Trial Court in this instance had to deal with. 
One more observation should be made. To the extent that 
Plaintiff bottoms his argument upon such ^ Pennsylvania v ; 
case of Cover and Wife vs Man away , 8 A. 393, 1887," a c a s e -
not in point to the issue at hand, the following is apropos:.=. -r. - ^ -v : _ x 
- 25 -
"Judicial decisions are not, in a strict sense , authority, 
except in the jurisdiction where they are pronounced. The test-writers , 
and the courts generally, speak of these decisions as authority, but 
beyond the court's jurisdiction they have force only as arguments. They 
are not authority in the sense of having the force of absolute law, even in 
the jurisdiction where the court pronouncing them is the highest judicial 
tribunal. They may be overruled, and they will be overruled if clearly 
opposed to principle, . . . . " (The Work of the Advocate , the Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, page 42.) 
We are trying a case in Utah in 1976, not in Pennsulvania 
in 1887. 
Plaintiff's purpose in persistently hoping to force the burden of 
proof onto the Defendants is clear. If he can obtain a ruling that they musL 
show by whom, how, when, where, e t c . , the alteration was done, they are 
bound by it simply because it exis ts , because they truly do not know the 
answers to these questions. ~ 
His theory might have some weight if this were a matter of a 
document regular on its face, but it is not, and that is the entire case . 
Plaintiff claims to be obligated on the contract only according to a term : 
which is an obvious uninitialled alteration, not a document regular on its. xt* 
face. Defendants deny the validity of the obvious alteration, and deny the 
existence of the alteration as a term of the contract. The burden is right 
back on the Plaintiff to establish assent to , and thereby the validity of, 
the alteration as a term of the contract. 
Likewise Plaintiff repeatedly attempts to distort the case to 
the extent that the Defendants must assume the posture of one claiming 
forgery, to thrust the burden onto the Defendants. But, the case correctly 
remains a question of mutual assent to an uninitialled alteration, and the 
burden is properly on he who claims validity for the alteration to so prove. 
POINT THREE 
III . THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS PROPER PROVINCE " 
AND FURTHERMORE, CORRECT, IN FINDING THAT 
"IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ALTERATION OF THE DATE 
IN QUESTION WAS THE RESULT OF AN INADVERTENCE OR H 
MISTAKE RATHER THAN.PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. " 
Any and a l l obligation upon the part of the Defendants to 
es tabl i sh an affirmative defense by way of al terat ion of,the document . , . ; ' . 
was fulfilled beyond quest ion by referring the Trial Court to Exhibit 1, 
which shows the uninit ial led obvious al terat ion plain and clear on i ts 
f a c e . • 
Exhibit One is not control l ing. Plaintiff pe rs i s t s in 
attempting to distort language which is so plain it cannot be distorted
 K 
into any pre tense of es tabl ishing Exhibit 1 a s "controlling" . 
Page 3 , paragraph III, of Exhibit 1 s t a t e s : 
"It is mutually agreed and understood that th§ Bank of Vernal, 
Vernal, Utah , shal l act a s escrow,holder of al l documents appurterjant 
to or used ^ c o n n e c t i o n with this agreement until a l l amounts due 
hereunder are paid in full .upon the following terms and condi t ions , to -wi t . . v " 
(Emphasis added. ) 
t This does not es tab l i sh Exhibit 1 a s "coritfoiling" , but merely 
se t s up some routine escrow ins t ruc t ions . Furthermore, even if there was 
language in Exhibit 1 stating that it was "controlling";, s ince that document 
is marked over with obvious uninit ialled a l t e r a t ions , the Plaintiff, who 
asserts the validity of the added markings on the document, does indeed 
properly have the burden of proving the validity of the same. 
At page 33 of Plaintiff's brief, lines 6 and 7, Plaintiff wrongly 
asserts: "Defendants admitted execution and delivery into escrow thereof." 
(of Exhibit 1). His theory of the case continues to be bottomed upon an 
erroneous concept of the case . He fails to see that from the Answer 
through the trial , and to the present, the Defendants deny the validity of the 
uninitialled alteration affixed to the face of the document,which is plain to 
see , and deny the very existence of the alteration as a term of the contract. 
As to Plaintiff's allegations that in his view, the trial court 
erred, the Defendants have already supplied, supra, cases establishing 
the province of the court in this matter, the evaluation of the evidence. 
In the case at hand, the Plaintiff claimed the alteration was a 
part of the contract, agreed upon by mutual assent (although it has no 
authenticating initials). The Defendants made it clear that the alteration 
was a shock and surprise to them, and that they did not know how it came-&* 
to be on two copies of the Agreement. The trial court, after the benefit of 
discovery and testimony, found no mutual assent , but only that " . . . .it 
would appear that the alteration of the date in question was the result of 
an inadvertence or mistake rather than pursuant to agreement between the 
part ies." 
As to Plaintiff's contention that the lack of assent on the 
part of the Youngs to the change was a mistake on their part, it must be 
borne in mind that the evidence did not susta in a finding that the a l terat ion 
; even existed on the Agreement when the Youngs signed i t . - - :^  
In the argument of his third point , at page 40 of his brief, 
- l i n e s 19 through-24/Plaint i f f heaps shame upon himself by the revolting - ^ . 
asser t ion tha t "It is l ikely that when. . . M r s . Young was compelled to 
add her ini t ia ls to the others on page, 2 of Exhibits 1 and 2,.. . secre t ly ~ | 
she withheld the-t:£)nforming;change-o»,her own c o p y . " ; • - * 
It has to be borne in mind that the author of Plaintiff 's brief 
' was not even present at the negotiations he purports to-descr ibe to the 
Court, hence~ his pretended supposition of what was l ike ly , bears the 
imprint of frantic-desperate, speculat ion of an exceedingly unworthy nature...-^-,•:>, ,i:-,^ 
^ - - All the copies were passed among al l t b^ part ies for ini t ia l l ing, ^ 
#v v^ndif the Young's copy was in honesty to bear an a l t e ra t ion , a s eventually 
the other copies show, where was Bartman!s-outraged protes t .a t t h i s - , 
omission, when he had the Youngs copy in his hands and placed his ini t ials 
on i t ? - * 
v 4; The quest ion properly before this Court is whether to uphold 
the Trial Court ' s dec i s ion . However if the quest ion were concerning 
conduct , there is no conduct to shrink from on the part of the Youngs. It -
r£. is not they who are to benefit from an uninit ial led a l te ra t ion . It is not 
they who have had the escrow copy of the Agreement repeatedly in their J-
possess ion outs ide t h e presence of the other par ty. It is not they who 
served "Requests^for Admissioas'Lon the escrow officer and then obtained
 :% 
an Affidavit from that officer that the requests were "deemed admit ted", 
and this from an officer who represented the other party during the 
negot ia t ions , and which "Requests" deemed admitted bear contradictions 
within themse lves . 
If Plaintiff 's aforementioned speculat ion were t rue , which it 
is not , it would surely be the ruin of his c a s e . In Plaintiff 's claiming 
that " M r s . Young was compelled. . ." , Plaintiff t e l l s the Court she was 
act ing under compulsion or duress in signing away her interest in real 
property, and "compelled" to sign on terms unacceptab le to her. Plaintiff 
then a sks the Utah Supreme Court for its b less ing and a declarat ion of 
val idi ty upon a sale the Plaintiff c laims he secured by compulsion. 
The Trial Court ruled in conformance with the evidence 
before i t . Plaintiff's "Point Three" of al leged error is no more than a 
disgruntled complaint that he does not l ike the cour t ' s ruling nor does 
he want to be bound by i t . 
POINT FOUR 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT SUSTAINED THE BURDEN PLACED 
UPON HIM TO PROVE ASSENT TO THE UNINITIALISED 
ALTERATION. 
The Trial Court in its findings of facts s ta ted: 
" 2 . The two initialed a l tera t ions or changes in the substance 
of the text are found at page" 2 l ine 24 and 25 where the first payment due 
date was postponed from January, 1973 to November of 1973 and annually 
on said date thereafter . The next change of subs tance which was 
init ialled is at page 5 line 33 where the sums due of $12,000.00 or $22 ,921.00. 
.- are identified permitting postponement in the event buyers are^unable to•.•••; —.--•-K 
meet t he se paymentsv These two a l tera t ions in the original text are 
material and substant ive involving payment da tes or poss ib le postponement 
of payment da tes and the parties accorded them the formality of initialling 
t o clearly signify their a s sen t to the changes . " (Emphasis added. ) . 
"3v- The change from 1972 to 1973 at l ine 21 of:-paqe^2 is a • ^ ' 
change of equal or greater significance in that the same amounts to a 
relinguishment of in excess of $4,100 .00 in interest on the unpaid ba lance . 
On this evidence a lone , and the fact that the third original did not bear 
the alteration it would appear that t h e a l tera t ion of the date in question w a s . ^ ^ 
the resul t of an inadvertence or mistake rather than pursuant to agreement 
between the pa r t i e s . "(Emphasis added . ) - "^ 
Under facts such a s t h e s e , any theory of quantumtof evidence 
to be proven by the Defendants has been met, be it a requirement for a 
preponderance of ev idence , for clear and convincing ev idence , or for 
evidence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt! ,,.,•-- ' . -^ 
Plaintiff c i tes Northcrest , I n c . vs Walker Bank, 248 P2d 
692 , 122 U 268 in support of his pos i t ion . In Northcrest , the court > * 
s t a t ed , "Undisputed i s the Plaintiff 's contention that one who a s se r t s the 
invalidity of a deed must so prove by clear and convincing evidence." 
The Court then, after reviewing all the evidence in the record stated, 
"The evidence so satisfied the mind of the trial court." The court thus 
clearly demonstrated that the presumption of genuineness of an acknowledgme 
can be overcome. The Northcrest case , to the extent that it is applicable 
to the instant case , is a citation in favor of the Respondents,Youngs . 
But caveat as to Northcrest. It makes plain that the execution 
and acknowledgment of an instrument are two separate and independent ac t s . 
An acknowledgment deals with the authentication of the signature of ^ 
execution. An acknowledgment will not give validity to an instrument which 
otherwise is fatally defective. (Please see 1 Am. Jr. 2d, Acknowledgments, 
Section 80.) Generally it may be said that acknowledgment of an instrument 
cannot impart any validity to any instrument which is inherently invalid. 
(Please see 1 Am. Jr. 2d, Acknowledgments, Section 81). 
The case between Appellant Hartman and the Respondents Youngs 
is not a case of-the contest^ of-an/execution o ran acknowledgment.f The -i y 
entire issue is addressed to a different concept, to wit, the invalidity of an 
unsupported unauthorized uninitalled alteration in the body of the instrument. 
It is almost certain that the Justices who authored and concurred in the 
decision of Northcrest would be shocked, dismayed, and even aghast 
that their decision, which dealt with an improper acknowledgment of a 
forged signature on a deed should be attempted to be misconstrued and 
offered as support for the proposition that an unauthorized uninitialled 
alteration in the body of an instrument must stand as valid and binding 
on all part ies . 
The Court is invited by the Plaintiff Hartman to give its seal 
of approval to the notion that unsupported uninitialledunauthori zed obvious 
alterations must stand against the protests of the disadvantaged signor, 
:•---\:.simply because the alterations are there. One can imagine the havoc such a 
rule of law as Plaintiff urges would create in real estate deeds, where there 
could be no protest to the marked over enlargement of a land description/ 
Or the fear and uncertainty that,would affect all persons .-with/documents in 
escrow such as the Youngs, where as in this case, as set forth;in the 
affidavit of N. J. Meagher, (R 119) the opposing party is given the
 e" 
document at issue from the escrow, outside the presence of the other party 
to the transaction and the escrow. ; v 
Plaintiffs Appellant in this case would hope to persuade the ' 
;
 - Court that when parties have a document in escrow, which document as to 
'.\v** all of its alterations, as opposed to interlineations and filling in of rr; 
blanks, have authenticating initials, except one significant obvious ^ 
uninitialed alteration, which^aIteration is vigorously in dispute as to its w^ 
validity, — the Appellant Hartman would seek to have the Court adopt a 
>i\ rule of law that would declare the uninitialed entry valid. Thus if an -
: :
^ employment-trainee filing clerk (o^-another) inadvertently (or intentionally) 
: "' opens an escrow file and makes a change in the wording or figures, the 
.**»••-- uninitialled change would be upheld by the Court simply because it is there. 
Defendants-Respondents are undoubtedly joined by thousands 
- "V who have documents in escrow who fervently believe such is not now and 
will not ever become the law of Utah. Appellant's proposed rule of law to 
^ ,. „, overturn the decision of the trial court is shocking beyond belief in its "- ~ 
Plaintiff refers to U . C . A . 7 8 - 2 5 - 7 , "Cert if icate of 
acknowledgment as evidence of execution" . Again he misses the point of 
the c a s e , purporting to put this matter into the posture of a. matter of a 
writing regular on i ts f ace . The Agreement is obviously a l te red , thus 
not regular on i t s f a c e . 
The more appropriate s t a tu t e , ac tua l ly appl icable to the c a s e 
at hand is U . C . A . 78-25-17, "Writing bearing obvious al terat ions — 
Explanation required ." The text s t a t e s : 
"The party producing as genuine a writing which has been 
a l te red , or appears to have been al tered after i ts execution in a part 
material to the quest ion in d ispute must account for the appearance of 
a l t e r a t i o n . . . " 
As applied to th is c a s e , this s ta tu te puts the burden of 
proof where it c learly be longs , on Appellant Hartman. 
For Appellant Hartman, the "beauty" of his argument is that 
s ince the al terat ion now e x i s t s , the Youngs must be bound by i t , or 
produce evidence of how, when , where , and why, the change was made . 
This the Youngs cannot d o , because the change was made without their 
knowledge or a s s e n t . Hartman*s proposed outcome would create a 
hideous miscarriage of jus t i ce and es tab l i sh a s a rule of law through th is 
ca se an intolerable principle of error. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a review of the t ranscr ipt and the record 
e s t ab l i shes several important po in t s , which should be disposi t ive of 
the appeal in favor of the Respondents Youngs, and in favor of upholding 
the tr ial court . 
1 . It is apparent that Hartman was concerned about having 
to pay "too much money, too quick ly" , and d i scuss ion followed on 
that point , with a change in the payment date from January to November, 
and a "forgiveness of payment" time ex tens ion . These significant 
changes were agreed upon and evidenced by ini t ial l ing by the par t ies . 
It is equally clear that the d i scuss ion never deal t with a proposal that 
l e s s money would be paid by foregoing interes t for one year . 
2 . It is apparent that al l copies of the Agreement were 
passed back and forth among al l par t ies for in i t ia l l ing , and no party 
placed ini t ials on any copy at the purported change which now exis t s 
on the two copies to which Hartman has had a c c e s s , his own, and the 
escrow copy. It does not e scape notice that throughout the proceedings , 
no person acknowledges authorship of the change on Exhibit 1 . 
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3 . Faced with an obviously al tered document, the 
Trial Court correctly placed the burden of proof on the party asse r t ing that 
the uninitialled al terat ion was va l id . Considering the evidence before 
the Trial Court, it met any standard that could have been required, 
preponderancev clear and convincing, or even beyond a reasonable doubt, 
upon which to basre i ts rul ing. :, 
-u. The decis ion of the Trial Court in favor of the Respondents -
Youngs should be upheld . 
DATED: March 12, 1976 . 
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